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FRAGMENT FROM THE RECENT HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZED SERVICE

BY HOBART N. YOUNG

I

THE HISTORY of an attitude becomes more and more a proper concern of military history. Refinement of tools in the fields of social psychology and public opinion, together with development in the fields of mass communications and psychological warfare, serve to delineate problems of attitude that in due course confront the military historian. Specifically, some recent attitudes within the Organized Reserves* present a problem in military history and a matter of no little significance for the national defense policy of a democracy. The case in point concerns attitudes appearing—or public opinion existing among reservists as “a public”—among the Reserves during their call-up for the initial stages of the conflict in Korea after June 1950.

When, as in the instant case, the period involved has passed, the basic episode was relatively small, and primary documentation remains practically nonexistent, the difficulty is obvious. Yet the Reserves are a continuing institution in American life and continue to undergo confusing reorganizations and disturbing vicissitudes tied in

with the larger question of Universal Military Training policy. What can be learned from episodes in the past experience of the Reserves should not go by default. This becomes important particularly in the light of subsequent events involving pressuring and brain-washing, the repatriation of some and the arbitrary retention of other United Nations' military personnel by Communist regimes. Attitude and morale, together with public opinion and *esprit de corps*, attain fresh significance in these days. The specific state of mind of American reservists becomes a matter that the conscientious military historian should not ignore or evade.

II

It is said of our democracy that we do not want consensus and conformity if the price is indoctrination. Certainly we did not get, and perhaps could not get, under democratic conditions, conformity of opinion among the Organized Reserves following World War II. Yet evidently enough people stayed with the Reserves, through thick and thin regulations, through successive adjustments in the reserve program, for, when the calls to active duty for the Korean crisis came, a creditable build-up of the armed forces depended upon the civilian components almost as much as in World War II.

*What is said here applies literally to the Army but can best be understood in the broad sense of meaning all the civilian components under all the departments within the Department of Defense, and as distinguished from the fine old term, “the unorganized militia.”

In the midst of the voluntary and involuntary recalls to extended active duty in connection with Korea a flurry of critical opinion arose among some of the Reserves. Some of this personnel found satisfaction and vindication in the "reorganization" which followed and set up a "Standby" category, among other changes and distinctions. No apparent damage to the national defense seems to have resulted from this much lack of uniformity of opinion and service in connection with Korea. Reservists responded and such Reserve training as they had been able to acquire in the course of so many postwar developments proved useful to them and to the nation. How much more efficient the whole performance might have been is not the point in issue here. The point well worth pursuing, however, concerns the sheer lack of consensus and conformity to national policy and what that lack may signify for the future. The lack did not then signify disastrous inefficiency. It certainly did not attest to indoctrination. But does it suggest nothing more than standard irreducible military "griping"?

The Reserves hereafter will constitute a much more numerous segment of the population than in the past. This seems to be the intention if not the enforceable law.* There is, however, no necessary implication that the obligated, but as yet largely sleeping, Reserves, any more than other fractions of American citizenry, will seriously fail to go along with what their government from time to time decides is required for the national defense. There is no reason to believe that the degree of conformity among reservists, or the reservists' effect upon the community, will be essentially different than heretofore solely because they will be more numerous. But the fact remains that there have been

times in the recent past when the Reserves have included some willful elements voicing objections to policies, and times when the Reserves have had to get along without the support of elements which were eligible, or even obligated, to participate. It is in view of those times when consensus and conformity have been, or may again be, appreciably lacking that a question regarding indoctrination or adequacy of orientation arises. Certainly there should be no intention of decrying a reasonable and responsible nonuniformity. However, what has or has not been achieved in regard to stimulating the reservists's views and motivation concerning his military service may be a foretaste of what we will have at the higher levels of military participation and strength that are now in prospect. Higher levels of national and international tension place the reservist's views, and methods used, in an important light.

III

The exchange of prisoners in Korea in the spring of 1953 placed fresh emphasis on a basic problem. One batch of the exchanged American personnel was hurried back to the United States under circumstances that the press reported ambiguously. The issue arose as to whether the attitude of this personnel was officially in doubt, leading to court martial, or whether they were physically or mentally ill. In different form that problem could be studied during the preceding two years. For, there was evidence as early as 1951 that Americans returning to Reserve status from extended active duty would, during the ensuing few months and years, bring with them into their communities problems of orientation, readjustment, and morale. The attitudes of some imminent returnees were already becoming apparent.

As a symptom of those times, the case of

*The Public Law 51 (82nd Congress) provision for membership in the Reserve is not supported by punitive measures in practice, up to the time of this writing.

of reservists, privates and noncommissioned officers, scheduled for return to civilian life and for resumption of Reserve status in the autumn of 1951, was and still is worthy of attention. Individuals could be encountered who gave evidence of not knowing (and some not caring) why they were called to duty; some gave evidence of not liking what little they did seem to know about their being called up. That much luck of orientation, to be sure, would not in itself be surprising to an observer. It would not be unprecedented in the annals of human nature if a scattered few among reservists could be found who, on the basis of their own particular experience in the armed services during the period of Korean hostilities, concluded, for instance, that their time and hence the government's money in their case had been largely wasted. Such a conclusion is undesirable in a young man called to military duty from college or from a trade. He was interrupted, to say the least.

Typically, he can point to the waste involved. He may respond somewhat to the proposition, if put to him, that war is a waste that democracies would not themselves prepare or wage if they had any choice in the matter. He has only to glance at Soviet absolutism and imperialism for his fundamental answer as to why we prepare and against what threats to national existence and individual values. But he may be more impressed with the fact that the work load where he has been assigned has been extremely spotty. He can doubtlessly point out inefficiencies — chargeable to others, of course. He is likely to be predisposed to these judgments because his civilian career was interrupted, incurring a relative waste to *him* of his personal, civilian time. He is mercifully blind to inefficiencies which he himself contributed to the defense efforts through lack of interest, initiative, skill or ambition. Furthermore, he may not have received guidance and

assistance sufficiently strong to persuade a person of his tastes to exploit for self-improvement the periods of slack work and off-duty hours while in the military service. The opportunity and the means for personal improvement and individual effort, with regard to immediately applicable military skills, to military education and even to civilian and technical education, may not have been pointed out to him effectively.

IV

It seems unlikely that the veteran or non-veteran citizen would avidly thrill to the pertinent *facts* with regard to this more than to many another worthy subject of discussion, were he to read or hear them at all. The facts are circuitous compared to what he already feels in a flash. Facts have the inevitable technical or dry sound and threaten to lead on interminably.* Nevertheless, in the face of the facts and the rationale that could have been available to him, some reservists revealed

*There was no real lack of factual, rational basis for what happened to the reservist in 1950. It is well to recall the stuff of which explanations or indoctrination for that personnel would have been made at the start of the Korean crisis. Much hinged on the need for and the function of filler replacements. "Replacements" would have helped explain to the young soldier in 1950 why the Volunteer Reserve was called to Active Duty before major organized units were called. The replacement system was part of the rationale, structure, and function that pertained to the national defense situation and to the utilization of the Reserve. It is to be noted that a reorganization subsequently occurred which undertook to provide formally for less than all-out emergencies by setting up Ready Reserve as distinguished from Standby. But the rationale, even as of that earlier period, was not far to seek. The need for maintaining the integrity of units, since organized Reserve units were the only Sunday punch the nation had, should logically, have interested the reservist if adequately presented. Or, the presence of small, specialized units in the Reserve program could serve to explain to him why those units would not be needed and must be saved *until* an emergency expansion reached levels at which such units and individuals—interrogator teams, bath units, bakeries, laundries, staff specialists—are solely designed to function. If such units were cannibalized to secure filler replacements for other branches and units before the emergency had developed clearly enough, the specialization represented by the small-unit personnel would not be available in the crises for which they were designed.

a symptom of profound unfamiliarity with the situation and lack of mental preparation, for some complained that the more active reservists or the more senior officers should have been called up individually before *they were*. Does such a reaction on the reservist's part leave something to be desired, not only for his satisfaction but for the good of the military service in which he served? Does he speak out of pique, or from sheer ignorance? Should he or could he be afforded information that would settle these or other dissatisfactions? Is there adequate provision for catharsis and remedial explanation? Is it enough that any dissatisfactions felt are, at the moment at least, not numerous and not widely shared or concerted?

V

If means were not at hand or not used in order to reconcile the reservist to the necessity and rationale of his personal change from civilian to military status there was an apparent "psychological" advantage — an orientation — lost for him and for the community. If any young citizen could have been forewarned and forearmed to grasp firmly and to meet resolutely the job to be done, the reservist might logically be the one.

The situation of the individual chosen by the Selective Service mechanism and processed through to the Army has its own set of explanations as to why the particular individual is differentiated from so many others to assume unfamiliar and relatively unexpected military duties. That involves the responsibility and initiative of a civilian agency, Selective Service, and not the military services, and is not well recognized. The military services receiving this personnel are legatees of some unfavorable attitudes and processes over which they have no control. This legacy must nevertheless be offset in and by the services. The situation of the reservist, however, is presumably more favor-

able than that. He was, at the time of call-up in 1950 already a practically processed and trained, more-nearly organic member of a continuing organization predesignated for known duties. He should have known something about the national defense because he was a part of it. His call-up was presumably central to and integral with the very plans by which it was at all possible to utilize Selectees. The reservist was a prerequisite, the basis for the build-up. His key function was knowable and reasonable, if not uppermost in his own mind at the time.

This, of course, is a problem that concerns, among others, the individual's commanding officers while the man is on active duty. It becomes, however, most directly the problem of the Reserve Officer, himself essentially a civilian citizen, in whose unit and home town the called-up reservist formerly was and in whose unit the returnee should presently lodge. That part-time soldier — the Reserve Officer, in his year-in and year-out capacity in the Organized Reserves *not* on extended active duty — will have to be sound in his own attitude and grasp of the Reserve situation if he is to exercise beneficial influence within the body of the Reserves.

VI

If it were not for the subsequent cases of the returnees from prisoner-of-war status, the short answer might be that enough Americans simply saw their duty and did it, with or without fancy orientations and motivation. The reservist behaved like any other good American. Normal incidence of gold-bricking, inefficiency, griping, and even defection do not, in themselves, merit close scrutiny. Routine morale studies would then suffice to keep tabs on the situation. Little that could be dignified by the name of military history would be involved.

When exceptions and exceptional circumstances occur as in the case of the "pro-

gressives," the brain-washed, and the confessors among the returned prisoners of Little Switch or Big Switch in 1953, it begins to appear that the short answers are not adequate and that the unaided common sense of the average American deserves supportive measures. The crucial question then becomes, "What supportive measures?" Short answers to questions regarding the efficacy and extent of the measures thus far employed and to the whole problem of servicemen returning to the Zone of the Interior, or to civilian life from local duty, may be congenial to decisive field commanders. Anything except the short, simple answer might appear to them to be unnecessarily roundabout. Nevertheless, these are days of psychological warfare, cold war, and grand strategy when longer answers and subtler questions are almost inevitable. Someone, if not always and exclusively the combat commanders, may have to record, study, and prepare subtler answers for wide application. Spade work in military history will be sorely needed.

The attitudes and instructions with which Americans are equipped when they go into captivity have now become unmistakably important. For, Man has again entered an era when the detention of foreign military and other personnel at the caprice of one power's regime has gone very far. Such detention has become a commonplace, in contravention of what had become normal (or at least nominal) international respect for agreements, customs, and orderly procedure. This much regression on the part of some governments need not drag down all governments to the new substandard level. Quite to the contrary, the most advanced peoples might now be stimulated to clarify and strengthen their intellectual and psychological position beyond points heretofore felt to be necessary. More than ever, rationale of "why we fight" must be sound, shared, and rational. Backsliders may help, by their very

example, to define the true nature of attainable goals of conduct. Such personnel may serve to warn us concerning how and why we fail plus how and why we might succeed better than we do. These are all matters that require careful documentation.

A thing frequently and fortunately said these days is that something qualitative, rather than sheer quantity either of manpower or material, can prove to be the saving grace of the Western world. If that sort of generalization means anything it should mean that the quality of life, of convictions and comprehension, quite as much as American industrial potential, can stand the world in good stead now. It probably means that what was good about the World War II efforts to discuss "why we fight," both inside and outside the armed forces and by the British as well as the Americans, is applicable and should be strengthened now. What was bad about those efforts should now be avoided. What caused derision with regard to the corresponding efforts made in World War I and currently surely need not be repeated *ad infinitum*. The Army has latterly been equipped with Information and Education programs, although this has been called a "frill" by economizers and some field commanders. How effectively that orientation and development work reaches the individual soldiers who need it most, only the Army is in a position to say even quantitatively. Qualitatively, only a few specimens began to make their appearance in the form of returning reservists as a basis for early analysis. We might have studied them, with benefit to all concerned. We can conjure with them, even now, and be alerted to record fresh cases and circumstances.

It is precisely in the larger context of the history of post-World War II ideological warfare, whether in cold-war or shooting-war aspects, that the successful orientation of personnel has gained significance. Only

with an historical and society-wide perspective can the nature and adequacy, or the legitimacy and desirability, of the means used be matched against the ends sought.

VII

How many individuals emerge from the Army after their stint and after the impact, whatever it is, of Information and Education and then refuse to participate in the Reserve program? This is the kind of specific measurement that the Army alone is in a position to make. How many individuals so emerge and so refuse, currently and in future, is a matter of interest and importance for military historians. For the matter takes on additional connotations if the returnee knows he is disobeying the law which says that he still has a military obligation, namely in the Reserves. The impact upon American morality is no better if he knows there is tacit agreement that he can break that law with impunity, that in spite of that law's vital purport it is only a technicality and a dead letter. Of course, if some day the particular law were to be enforced to the hilt, there is no clear indication that he would not respond as the Reserves have always responded before, adequately, on the whole, though somewhat clamorously.

The nation will not fall apart if civic virtue does not improve rapidly and if civilians do not straightway learn more about the military facts of life than have the individuals who revert today or tomorrow to civilian-reservist status. Nevertheless, the nation might stand more firmly and effectively were its members, both citizen-soldier and civilian, in fact more thoughtful and informed about its military affairs. The reactions of a few early returnees after an emergency call-up, and the nature of their impact or lack of impact upon the community may prove to be an index — indicate the tone — of what democratic life will be in the foreseeable future.

If they return with a dull thud, bringing no notable convictions except negative ones, the fact may be well worth noting for future reference. A lethargic response to the call to arms and a lethargic return to civilian life are one thing. If accompanied by an ostensibly negative attitude toward military service completed and Reserve status incurred, it is a worse thing, unmistakably bespeaking poor motivations and a failure of the means used for orientation. It is by no means likely that an essential degree of homogeneity in the populace hangs in the balance. There is, however, room for studies and estimates as to desirable versus probable degrees and the conditions surrounding their attainment.

Nothing affecting American attitudes that has gone on, up to and including the Korean crisis, has had apparently damaging results. Evidently the pattern of our precipitous return, hurrying home after World War II, was not so recent that it specifically impeded cooperation by the citizenry in essential phases of the Korean crisis. There was not the political pressure to "bring the boys home" after the Korean truce. Evidently all the post-World War II banter about "taking to the hills next time" was, after all, only banter. Not all the good will, or the dubious slogans and hoary canards, as the case may be, that the Army *par excellence* inherits from past veterans, from current vagaries of local Selective Service Boards or from its own Information and Education program, is clearly traceable by the casual observer.

There is in all this, however, some question of how *well* the nation can long exist, under ideological warfare, part suffering the casualties and part even less effectively and unselfishly participant than in World War II. That fractionation of the population refers, of course, to civic morality and unity and to the prospect of fighting chronic, distant border wars somewhat as in Victoria's day — matters beyond the scope of this writ-

ing. The point to be made just here is more elementary: in these days of budgetary billions, intercontinental distances, supersonic speeds, and astronomical devastation, a situation involving the lives and outlook of a few hundred thousand fellow citizens more or less, in uniform, will not really impress some minds numerically and does not incite effective all-out, conscience-smitten civilian participation or support. Actual military figures, published or unpublishable, mean very little to good citizens except in a limited albeit poignant way to relatives of individuals who themselves become a statistic directly. Even the casualty list of the first Korean year failed to impress. No moral regeneration swept the land. Politics and business and strikes and sporting events kept on as usual. Civil Defense continued to lack support. Civic virtue did not reach a new high, stimulated by published figures. In such an atmosphere it would be miraculous if the young citizen in uniform would automatically or readily acquire a highly affirmative attitude toward his military service, toward his return to civilian life and toward his remaining obligation to stay in and train with the Reserve. As a matter of fact, he probably reacts well enough, just as the civilian community carries on well enough. The leaders of our armed forces voice publicly no audible alarm on this score.

VIII

He who runs back to civilian life may not prove willing to read or even to listen if, indeed, channels of communication to him are actually open. As a matter of fact, there is some question whether the nation is equipped with forums, either inside or outside the armed forces, where enough oral discussion can be promoted by and for the multiplicity of parties concerned. It is a question of the present availability of habit, customs, mood, media, appropriate proce-

dures. Can it be claimed that the means for technically sound adult education are available and in operation on the scale indicated, even for oral interchange alone? Can it be claimed that the civilians who run about in pursuit of livelihood are more receptive or mechanically reachable, than the returning soldier, sailor, or airman?

It is too late now to help or even to reach the returned reservist except rarely by adult education outside the armed services. Whatever means can be suggested for reaching personnel who ultimately will emerge into civilian ranks, with or without firm Reserve responsibilities, civilian adult education will remain the terminal, residual one. Looking upstream, it is therefore logical to consider what might be done for the orientation of individuals while they are still in the service. Yet no great change can be expected because it is repugnant to consider that citizens in uniform constitute a captive audience that can be used intensively. Farther upstream are the high-school students but the guidance courses sometimes offered them in anticipation of military service cannot have more force or effect than for any other captive audience. Finally, of course, there is no source or locus of personnel except the great body of civilians, the carriers of the culture. It is a counsel of perfection to suggest that the population of a democracy would be the better for a course in modern civics, national policy, and military strategy. The forbearance and urbanity required of a citizen in dealing with a military segment of citizenship is scarce and hard to come by.

IX

The climate and channels of civilian orientation, along with the use or abuse of so specific a mechanism as the Information and Education program of the Army, thus require assessment by military historians. In context and in detail the problem of attitude

and orientation in so narrow an instance as the Reserves will merit professional attention. For, must it not be recorded that many a reservist in 1950 needed some alternative to casting about in his mind, as he tended to do, in order to put his finger on someone else who should have served instead of himself? An attitude that the man who serves his country in times of such emergency is "stuck," is axiomatically bad for all concerned. If he honestly does not have sufficient facts about the Reserve program, he is naturally and too easily tempted to misinterpret the potentialities. It is then easy to parrot the columnists who publicize, without explaining or perhaps even understanding, the flaws. That, after all, is how most exposé columnists maintain their rate of output and

make a living. But the Reservist, the Selectee, and the average citizen as well, will make a better life if they set out to reconcile the national necessities with the administrative facts of life, to reconcile the cumbersome of any huge organization with the hugeness and complexity of national preparedness, and so on. Quite apart from elements of selfishness in his wishing to change the rules of the game so as to win an outcome more favorable to his short-run selfish interests, the young citizen probably needs discussion on these points. His fellow citizens would do well to be alert to his symptoms, help reach a diagnosis, and proceed to remedies in their own thinking as well as in his. These are needs that, if long unfulfilled, will mar the quality of our national life.



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HERALDS OF THE IMPERIALISTIC WARS

By JOSEPH J. MATHEWS*

NO NEWSPAPER adventure story has ever quite equalled Henry Morton Stanley's quest for the lost missionary. The setting for the search was almost perfect. There was already wide and intense concern about Dr. Livingstone who had disappeared into the vast and "unknown continent." And in the end—after a long period of suspense and heroic effort—there was success. Or was there? Doubting Thomases refused to accept Stanley's word, and the suspense was prolonged until there was better proof that he had actually found his man. Yet, in spite of the intrinsic appeal of the adventure itself, it is entirely possible that at another time Stanley could have made his search for Livingstone in relative oblivion.

In the early eighteen seventies a new mood was coming over the white man's world, one which looked outward to the unexplored parts of Asia and Africa. Its spirit was that of romance, adventure, and missionary zeal. Though as yet not clearly conscious of the fact, Europe was shifting away from its emphasis on internal affairs and fratricidal strife. The second great period of European imperialism was in the process of opening. The United States, with a West of its own not yet entirely conquered, was still several decades away from the fantastic jingoism that culminated in the Spanish-American

War, but here too there was a kindred appetite for adventure and an intense interest in far-off places and strange people. Stanley's venture was, after all, instigated by the *New York Herald*. Americans were as eager as the English and French to follow Phineas Fogg and make Jules Verne's *Around the World in Eighty Days* a best seller. A little later the Yankee audience was ready to repeat the journey with Nellie Bly of the *New York World* and to greet her success (in besting Fogg's record) with brass bands and fireworks at virtually every railway station from San Francisco to New York.

There were newspaper men who read the signs of the times and forged their journals into organs of adventure. What they contributed to the spirit of adventure is more easily overlooked than the contributions made by the authors of books. When Rudyard Kipling, H. M. Stanley, Richard Harding Davis, and Jules Verne produced books of adventure that captivated readers by the thousands, they were credited with having encouraged as well as having recognized the public mood. When newspapers followed the course of an exploration, or sent deputies to report a military expedition, their efforts could be dismissed as little more than normal reporting. But the newspapers did not stop at reporting what they found: They created adventure where there was none. Two French journals improved the formula for racing a

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newspaper reporter around the world against time by having a brace of reporters race each other. This feat was performed at the turn of the century by Henri Turot of the *Journal des Débats* and Gaston Stéigler of *Le Matin*.¹ Not until 1936, when representatives of three New York papers made it a tri-cornered race, was the next logical step taken.

In the service of the London *Daily News*, Edmond O'Donovan penetrated the interior of Central Asia in the seventies to become for a time one of the ruling triumvirs of Merv.² Then, there was the fabulous exploit of the New York *Herald's* J. A. MacGahan who defied absolute prohibitions to follow a Russian force for sixty days through the deserts of Asia to Khiva and to produce greater fame for himself than for the expedition he was engaged in reporting.³ When Stanley became presumably lost on an African exploration subsequent to the finding of Livingstone, two New York papers, the *World* and the *Herald*, created a diversionary adventure by sending out competitive expeditions to find him. So great did the obsessions with stunts become that it sometimes produced absurdities or near calamities. An editor of *Le Matin* decided to determine whether Newfoundland dogs merited their reputation for life saving. With a full complement of journalists on hand to serve as judges (and reporters), the editor plunged into the Seine and was duly rescued. The ill-famed "wild animal hoax" of the New York *Herald* (Nov. 9, 1874), a fake story of the escape of wild animals from the Central Park Zoo, had the unanticipated effect of bringing the city to the verge of panic. Beyond serious question, there was during the last decades of the nineteenth

century a receptive audience for fanciful enterprises.

The most consistently available adventures in the press of the period, however, were those which derived from the wars, especially from the small imperialistic wars. For more than a quarter of a century these wars supplied the journals with genuine adventure stories along with descriptions of intriguing lands and their inhabitants. Perhaps such accounts should not be listed with sensational newspaper stunts, for they were not cut entirely from the same cloth. Nor should the reporting of the frontier wars be considered as the same kind of news as that which began at the end of the period with the appearance of Richard Harding Davis and his disciples. The correspondent of the imperialistic wars attempted to give the whole story, not merely selected incidents. Yet, synthetic stunts and genuine war adventure stories did have certain appeals in common, and it is reasonable to assume that they found acceptance, in part at least, for similar reasons.

To the sober historian who attempts to interpret the amazing expansion of Europe in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the new era of imperialism was basically a product of unromantic political and economic forces. The demand for raw materials, the need for new markets, the availability of surplus capital, and the greedy yearnings of nationalism—these were the fundamental stimuli of expansion. Where among such weighty factors did missionary zeal, the white man's burden, and the spirit of sheer adventure which so marked the age belong? For all save the economic determinists, or cynics who dismiss idealism as pious camouflage for intentional meanness, the question is a profound and difficult one. The spirit of adventure and the sense of moral responsibility were integral parts of the problem, not

¹A. de Chambre, *A travers la presse* (Paris, 1914), p. 448.

²Edmond O'Donovan, *The Merv Oasis* (2 vols.; London, 1882).

³James A. MacGahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus, and the Fall of Khiva* (New York, 1874).

merely a veneer for it. Back of the conquests in Africa and Asia were the hard facts of market demands, raw material needs, and surplus capital looking for new investment locations; but there was also faith in a mission of civilization, and there was romance.

From the viewpoint of a later day the conquest of Africa seems unbelievably short—the greater part of a continent was partitioned in a little more than two decades. But at the time the process seemed long and expensive, and failures often loomed larger than successes. There was constant bloodshed as the imperialistic powers clashed with the “backward” peoples. The wars needed not only initial but continuing justification on something more than a purely mercenary basis, more even than the mere desire to advance the national flag. The greater part of the information that the public received about the conflicts came through the press. Newspapers were not invariably represented at the scenes of war, but when their correspondents were not present the news was usually scanty. The great bulk of the news, therefore, flowed from the pens of the war correspondents. From the jungles of Africa and the deserts of Asia they related the activities of the marching troops. Perhaps by examining their role we can see imperialism on the march as it looked to many of the “civilized” people of the age. At any rate, we can see something of how it was presented to them.

During the last thirty years of the nineteenth century there occurred more than thirty wars between the military forces of the imperialistic powers and those of the people who were the objects of their imperialism. No positive count of these conflicts is entirely satisfactory since the second or third war in a particular area was usually a continuation of the first; also in a few instances less formidable terms such as mis-

sion, expedition, or insurrection are preferable to war; but it makes little difference if we telescope the count or soften the label. Small wars by military definition excluded anything but conflicts involving regular, disciplined troops against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.⁴ Some of the larger wars of the period which do not fit this definition should be numbered among the wars of imperialism, but their news coverage was more like that of other large conflicts; for that reason they are not included here. Rarely did the small wars involve more than a few thousand regular troops, including natives that normally constituted a part of the regular forces. At the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 Kitchener commanded over 20,000 English and Egyptian soldiers, but this was an exceptionally large force. In most of the engagements against the Dervishes in the Sudan, the English forces were under 5,000. Some of the imperialistic expeditions were purely and simply campaigns of conquest or annexation; sometimes they had as their aim the suppression of lawlessness in territories already conquered or annexed; a few were undertaken to wipe out what was considered an insult, or to avenge a wrong, or to end an actual or potential threat in territory adjacent to that already conquered. To some degree the objectives of a particular conflict influenced the character of the news, but in general the news followed a similar pattern.

Unlike the larger wars of the period, which became highly internationalized in their news coverage, an imperialistic expedition was normally viewed as the private affairs of the power responsible for dispatching the expedition. At least it was so interpreted by the imperialistic power. Most of the reporting was done from the side of

⁴C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice* (London, 1906), p. 21.

the regular troops for the citizens of the imperialistic power by the members of the press of that power. Of course there were exceptions. The Boxer War in 1900 was a cooperative effort between several great powers and its news gathering was quite cosmopolitan. American newspaper correspondents joined several of the British expeditions into the Sudan, while earlier Henry M. Stanley accompanied the British Abyssinian and Ashanti campaigns for the *New York Herald*. Now and then an English correspondent joined a French expedition—A. R. Colquhoun did in the Franco-Chinese War that secured Annam for France in 1885, and Lt. Col. Reginald Rankin accompanied a French force in North Africa in 1908.⁵ Another English reporter, Frederick Villiers, reported the Spanish expedition against the Riff tribesmen in 1910. Usually when foreign press representatives were permitted to accompany an expedition, they represented a friendly power or at least one that was disinterested in playing the role of competitor in the particular region. One of the most unusual stories in the annals of war reporting is that of M. Houel, a correspondent of *Le Matin*. During the French expedition into the Chaouiya district of Morocco in 1908, Houel attached himself to the native ruler, Mulai Hafid, instead of to the French troops, and succeeded in this very dangerous situation in performing valuable services for the French by acting as an emissary between the French and the Arabs.⁶

Possibly an even better illustration of the exceptional is the reporting of the French invasion of Madagascar in 1895. The best news accounts in this affair came from the pens of English correspondents that reported from the native rather than the European camp. To further confound the usual rule,

the French correspondents, who were usually well-behaved when reporting their own wars, criticized the expedition, quarreled with the French commander, and went home before the expedition reached its destination. The only correspondent who accompanied the French forces the whole way was, of all people, a German, Herr Wolf of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, whose accounts the French military found entirely satisfactory.⁷

There was neither opportunity for obtaining nor demand in the little wars of the kind of hodgepodge news gathering by innumerable correspondents which was beginning to characterize the wars between great powers. Major engagements in a large war were intricate, formal, and remote, enforcing on those who described them an attempt at detached, technical analysis. Large wars were beginning to require complex organization in news coverage and elaborate communication arrangements. In them the role of the press association was becoming increasingly prominent as individual journals found the machinery now required for coverage too costly to bear alone. Press associations had a part in reporting the little wars too, but it was rather like that of the individual papers. The correspondent who represented Reuters or Havas differed from the reporter for the *Daily Telegraph* or *Le Temps* in that his chief assignment was that of dispatching brief telegraphic messages of fact, and for this purpose he could usually count on aid from the agents of his association to be found even in remote communications centers.

Correspondents of French newspapers were inclined to leave the telegraphic field to Havas, but the English reporters used the wires when available. The correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* in Madagascar was astounded when a French reporter remarked:

⁵Reginald Rankin, *In Morocco with General D'Amade* (London, 1905), pp. 97, 246.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 150-51; 194-95.

⁷*Journal des Débats*, Sept. 2, 22, 1895; *Le Temps*, Aug. 29, Sept. 22, 1895; [London] *Times*, Sept. 23, 1895.

"Why should we send telegrams? The Havas Agency sends all the news by wire, and with the exception of events such as a big battle, it matters little whether it is published three weeks sooner or later."⁸ When Kitchener decided to limit correspondence in the Sudan to the letters of H. A. Gwynne of Reuters, in the mistaken idea that the British press could thus be served equitably and satisfactorily, he brought down upon himself a storm of protest. The comment of the *Daily News* on the Kitchener ruling was typical: "If the decree had been that no correspondent at all would be allowed, it might conceivably have been capable of defense on grounds of military expediency. But this is not the case. Sir Herbert Kitchener, it seems, does not object to correspondents altogether. What he objects to is the presence of independent correspondents."⁹ Reuters was, to be sure, under suspicion by virtue of its financial relationships with the government—as of course were Havas and Wolf—but the independent London dailies would have been unwilling to have Reuters serve all with war news even if that had not been the case. Exclusive news was as highly regarded in the imperialistic wars as in any other, but it was obtained as a result of great physical exertion on the part of the correspondent more often than through elaborate arrangements. "The work of a war correspondent," commented one observer, "appears to be journalism no longer, but simply horsemanship."¹⁰

The telegraph line was not always available to the correspondent. When there were no wires, it became necessary for him or his paper to make additional arrangements. During the Ashanti War in 1873-1874 one London paper maintained agents in no less than a half dozen ports to which ships from the

Gold Coast might come—Southampton, Lisbon, Gibraltar, Madeira, St. Vincent, and Sierra Leone. From the interior the correspondent sent his dispatches by courier to his agent on the Gold Coast. The agent then made the decision whether to entrust the messages to the captain of a government dispatch boat or to a ship sailing for a port where there was a second agent who could either send the information on by wire or forward it by another ship if no cable was available. Rivalry between competing agents was keen, and their pride in scoops equalled that of the correspondents. While the public became well enough acquainted with the correspondents, it seldom heard about the activities of these agents.¹¹

Viewed as a whole, the reporting of imperialistic wars by means of press representatives who accompanied the expeditions was largely though not exclusively an English enterprise. The war reporting tradition had become firmly established in the British press, and the expansion of the Empire provided steady employment for the war correspondent. After more than forty years of campaigning as artist and reporter in the service of London illustrated journals, Frederic Villiers was regarded as having witnessed more warfare than any man alive. Between the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 and the First Balkan War in 1912 Villiers served as a correspondent in no less than fifteen conflicts, most of them British imperialistic wars. He had seen service in Central Asia, Burma, Manchuria, Abyssinia, the Sudan, South Africa, and Tripoli.¹² Not far behind the record of Villiers' was that of Melton Prior, another London artist and reporter. Prior failed to see military action in only one year between 1872 and 1886. Somewhat shorter

¹¹A detailed account of one agent is given in "Transmitting the War News," *Gentlemen's Magazine* (Feb., 1875), New series, XIV, 213-18.

¹²Frederic Villiers, *Villiers, His Five Decades of Adventure* 2 vols.; (New York, 1920).

⁸*Pall Mall Gazette*, July 3, 1895.

⁹[London] *Daily News*, Jan. 11, 1898; also, Graham Storey, *Reuters' Century* (London, 1951), p. 97.

¹⁰Storey, *Reuters' Century*, p. 96.

in their terms of service but no less highly regarded in their time were a score or so of English war correspondents: Archibald Forbes, J. A. MacGahan, H. A. Gwynne, Charles Williams, G. A. Henty, Bennett Burleigh, E. F. Knight, G. W. Steevens, and the various Vizetellys.

For these men war reporting was a profession. So long as they devoted themselves to it any other assignment was secondary. Nowhere outside of London was there a group to compare with them. Most continental journalists who did war reporting regarded it as an out-of-the-ordinary assignment and rarely reported more than one war, although this was considerably less true after the turn of the century. The French correspondent, Ludovic Naudeau, reported the Russo-Japanese War from beginning to end and was still on the job during the Balkan Wars, and his compatriot, Reginald Kann, fought on the Boer side in South Africa and became a war reporter in Cuba, Manchuria, and Morocco. Ernesto Vassalo reported several wars for the Italian press. Some American reporters were even more persistent, and several of them—Richard Harding Davis, Julian Ralph, John Bass, James Creelman, and Frederick Palmer for example—wore the label of war correspondent for a considerable period. But even they hardly regarded their work in the same way it was viewed by the English professionals.

When the correspondent of a London daily arrived at the remote post that was to serve as the starting point for an expedition, he ordinarily found himself among old friends. There would likely be a new correspondent or two, for the campaigns took their constant toll of lives, and the ranks had to be replenished. In two years of Sudanese campaigns seven correspondents were killed, a fact appropriately commemorated by a tablet in St. Paul's, London, which stands with another memorial to thirteen journalists who

were casualties of the South African War. But the veteran correspondent invariably found some old friends among his colleagues, and likely he knew a number of the officers with whom he had served on previous campaigns. He knew the fighting records of the different units, the Gordon Highlanders, and 21st Lancers, and the 5th Gurkhas. Of necessity he shared the privations and the dangers of the troops, felt the camaraderie which comes to a small group of men confronting common perils, and took pride that was personal as well as national in their achievements. Their glory was his glory, and the correspondent felt it was his duty to see that the people back home understood and appreciated it. He sought not only to describe the activities and feelings of Tommy Atkins but also to serve as a spiritual link between the soldier and the homefolk. Thus G. W. Steevens ends a description of the elation felt by the soldiers at Atbara in 1898 with a reminder of the ties with home:

It was good to see the Tommies looking with new adoration to the comfort of their rifles, drunk with joy and triumph, yet touched with sudden awe in the presence of something so much more nakedly elemental than anything in their experience. Two hours had sobered them from boys into men. Just then there was nothing in the world or under it to which the army would not have been equal. Yet in that Godlike moment, I fancy every man in the force thought first of home.¹³

If the correspondent told his story in the first person, as he often did, it did not mean that he considered his own role the central one. He was reporting something of which he was a part; he was an eyewitness not in the aloof sense of being an observer but in the sense of being a participant. "I do not want the reader to think the personal incidents and adventures described in this book are extraordinary," wrote young Wins-

¹³G. W. Steevens, *With Kitchener to Khartoum* (New York, 1899), p. 152.

ton Churchill in the preface to a book based on his letters from South Africa. "They are included in the narrative, not on account of any peculiar or historic interest, but because this method is the easiest, and so far as my wit serves me, the best way of telling a story with due regard at once to detail and proportion."¹⁴ The virtues stressed by the correspondents were among the highest — courage, hard work, self-denial, loyalty and endurance. George W. Steevens forsook his early cynicism and a promising career as a scholar to become, as one commentator puts it, "A priest of the Imperialist idea." His thoughts transcended the immediate and the "glory of the Empire was ever uppermost in his writings."¹⁵ But Steevens was more concerned with the basic issues of imperialism than were most of his colleagues. The ordinary correspondent was content to think of himself as the "most successful recruiting officer of the Queen's Army," and his story as a glorious and romantic one because it described obviously romantic and glorious events.

The correspondent did not look upon ruthlessness in the imperial wars as he would have in an European struggle. Savages, he felt, could understand no other language, and there were always vicious atrocities committed by the barbarians to serve as justification. The racial superiority of the white man and his Divine right to rule were beyond question. "It did one good," Archibald Forbes remarked after a victory over the Zulus, "to see the glorious old 'white arm' reassert again its pristine prestige."¹⁶ But the natives were not denied the homage the correspondent always offered to courage. Forbes paid this tribute even while rejoicing

to see the "old white arm" reasserted:

The Zulus could not get to close quarters simply because of the sheer weight of our fire. The canister tore through them like harrow through weeds. The rockets ravaged their zigzag path through the masses. One rush came within a few yards, but it was the last effort of the heroic Zulus. Their noble ardour could not endure in the face of the appliances of civilized warfare. They began to waver. The time for the cavalry had at last come.¹⁷

The correspondent could well afford to admire bravery in a fallen foe since his own troops, as he reported it, possessed the quality to an unsurpassed degree. In explaining the loyalty of the black troops of Kitchener's own force, Steevens had the following to say:

And is it not good to think, ladies and gentlemen, as you walk in Piccadilly or the Mile End Road, that every one of these niggers honestly believes that to be English and to know fear are two things never heard of together? Utterly fearless themselves, savages brought up to think death in battle the natural lot of man, far preferable to defeat or disgrace, they have lived with English officers and English sergeants, through years of war and pestilence, and never seen any sign that these are not as contemptuous of death as themselves. They have seen many Englishmen die [;] they have never seen an Englishman show fear.¹⁸

For the reporter as for the soldier the great moment was the battle. Bennett Burleigh's description of the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 is typical in language and spirit of most of the imperialistic battle accounts:

Storm and cloud had passed. The moon rose early on the night of 1st September. It shone brightly over and around our bivouac, south of Kerreri village, or near Um Mutragan, according to the cartographers. Sentinels were posted along the irregular-shaped triangle, or, shall I call it, broken semi-circle, within which the army lay. . . . It was 3.40 a.m. on the 2nd September when the bugles called the 22,000 men of the Sirdar's army from slumber. Quickly the troops were astir, and the camp full of bustling preparation. . . . Everything was made as trim as possible, and belts were buckled tightly for action. There was a sense and

¹⁴Winston Spencer Churchill, *Ian Hamilton's March* (London, 1900), pp. ix-x.

¹⁵G. W. Steevens, *From Capetown to Ladysmith* (Edinburgh, 1900), p. 176.

¹⁶Archibald Forbes, *Memoirs and Studies of War and Peace* (New York, 1895), p. 44.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸Steevens, *With Kitchener to Khartoum*, p. 91.

expectancy of coming battle abroad, and an eager desire permeating all ranks to have it out with the dervishes then or never. . . . Everything was in readiness in our camp by 5 a.m. . . . It was a magnificent spectacle that rose before the Sirdar's army as the dervish columns came sweeping into view, filling the landscape between Surgam and Um Mutragan. In that great multitude were gathered the fiercest, most sanguinary body of savage warriors the world has ever held or known. Arabs and blacks, chosen by Abdullah himself, picked out because of their tried courage, strength, and devotion—the flower of the fighting Soudan tribes. . . . A great shout of exultation went up from the Dervish legions when they saw, ranged in the low ground before them, the Sirdar's small army, their imagined prey. . . . Never was there a grander, more imposing military display seen than when the great dervish army rushed to engage, heedless of life or death. In an instant the Sirdar, who stood near the right of Wauchope's brigade, passed an order for the three batteries on the left . . . to open fire. . . . The air was torn with hurling shell at the first awful salvo, when shrapnel burst in all directions, smiting the dervishes as with Heaven's thunderbolts, and strewing the ground with maimed and dead. The leading columns paused as if they had received a shock . . . the fire was rapidly increasing . . . the dervishes closed their ranks as with one accord, and came on with fresh energy. . . . In the face of a fire that mowed down battalions and smashed great gaps into their columns they flinched not. . . . Death was reaping a gigantic harvest. Hecatombs of slain were being spread everywhere in front. . . . So far we had scarcely suffered loss, only a few of the enemy's riflemen having paused and thought of firing at us. . . . It was about eight o'clock, and the first action was over and won. . . . With a trifling loss of a few hundred men he (the Sirdar) had discomfited and slain 10,000 of the great dervish army.¹⁹

During the long periods between skirmishes and battles, the frontier correspondent was faced with the problem of finding something to write about. He could not, unhappily, accept the view of Stephen Crane who declared that playwrights should report wars and simply lower the curtain when there was a

scarcity of activity.²⁰ Such prolific writers as G. A. Henty and H. M. Stanley were reduced in the Ashanti campaign to making a side expedition of their own in the hope of discovering some material for copy.²¹ Winston Churchill commented with reference to a prolonged lull during the Boer War: "All this might be war, but it was not journalism."²²

A correspondent for the London *Daily Mail* in the Spanish American War finally became so disgusted while awaiting developments in Florida that he let himself go completely:

I am sick of Tampa; I am sick of the sight of sand; I am sick of sunshine and illness; I am sick of swallowing liver pills; I am sick of quinine.

I am sick of a place in which Glorious War degenerates into a weary waste of time. . . . I am sick of the tomorrow which never comes.

I am sick of niggers. . . . I am sick of meeting new American acquaintances. . . . I am sick of the society of London friends. . . . I am sick of dirty-chinned Cubans chattering Spanish. I am sick of everything and everybody; I am sick of myself.²³

Many of the correspondent's letters were made up of travel descriptions, anecdotes of the march and of camp life, and portrayals of local customs. They explained the causes of conflict, always in terms of the immediate provocation, argued the advantages that peace and trade would bring to backward people, and examined the possibilities for obtaining raw material and markets for the mother country. Since some of this was poor stuff out of which to build romance and adventure, the correspondent often found the going rough, but he never renounced his trademark of adventure. Robert Graves once commented that "between 1887 and 1914 all professional soldiers belonged to one regiment,

²⁰John Berryman, *Stephen Crane* (New York, 1950), p. 219.

²¹Henry M. Stanley, *Coomassie and Magdala: The Story of Two British Campaigns in Africa* (London, 1874), pp. 88-89.

²²Churchill, *Ian Hamilton's March*, p. 3.

²³[London] *Daily Mail*, June 11, 1898 (Chas. E. Hands).

¹⁹Bennett Burleigh, *Khartoum Campaign* (London, 1898), pp. 135-98.

Kipling's own."²⁴ Reporters were in the regiment building business too, and their regiments were not unlike Kipling's own. If Tommy Atkins became in the minds of his fellow countrymen the symbol of courage and honor in battle, he could thank the correspondents as well as Kipling. Whether or not it was Tommy's humor that labeled his Sudanese opponents as Fuzzy-wuzzies and the Indian Khoukikails as Cookies, he received the credit *via* the correspondents.

Between the reporters and the generals in the little wars relations were not always harmonious. Commanders in the field had difficulty in overcoming the military traditions of distrust and contempt of the press. Although the generals could censor news dispatches (usually they censored telegrams but not letters), the correspondent could always go home and say what he pleased. Sometimes the attitude of the commanding officer created serious difficulties for the news gatherers. Sir Garnet Wolseley delighted in seeing that the writers earned their pay. During the Ashanti campaign, which he commanded, a correspondent complained: "The fact is that no facilities at all are offered to correspondents in this war. We may pick up our information as we can, for the answer of the staff to any inquirer is invariably, 'I don't know anything!'" When Wolseley did proffer information, it was not always dependable. Once during the Ashanti expedition he announced to the correspondents that he was moving East to attack a designated point, then moved West to attack another. Later in Egypt he had a staff officer assemble the correspondents in Alexandria and tell them that his point of departure for Tel-el-Kebir was Aboukir when in reality it was Ismalia.²⁵ Wolsely defended his philosophy of hoodwinking the press in

his *Soldiers' Pocket Book for Field Service*,²⁶ and once told a subordinate, "It is very necessary to manipulate correspondents, and to be at all times on the best of terms with them, but it must be done upon a system, and always with the knowledge of Genl. officer Comdg."²⁷

Lord Roberts, who was in charge of various British expeditions in India, had a somewhat different approach to the problem. He believed in being honest with the journalists and more than that in forcing the journalists to be truthful—as Lord Roberts interpreted the truth. He refused to transmit telegrams that were "absolutely incorrect and of the most alarming nature . . . until they had been revised in accordance with truth," and expelled a correspondent who had been "too imaginative" in his letters.²⁸ Sir Herbert Kitchener was another commander against whom the correspondents often felt they had legitimate grievances. In the Sudan in 1897 he found the tasks of supplying the troops extremely difficult. Although there were fewer than a dozen correspondents, their servants brought the number of their company to more than fifty, and Kitchener decided to keep all of them to the rear. The results were described by the *Times* correspondent:

We newspaper correspondents are still encamped on the river side at Merawi, scarcely justifying our presence in the Sudan, I imagine; but what can we do with our liberties so circumscribed, and kept as we are in almost complete ignorance of all that is taking place at the front? We do not even know where the Sirdar and his army are, or how far the Egyptians have pushed beyond the Berber.²⁹

²⁶Maj. Gen. Sir G. Wolseley, *The Soldiers' Pocket Book for Field Service* (3rd ed.; London, 1874), pp. 92, 93, 97, 249.

²⁷Maj. Gen. Sir F. Maurice and Sir George Arthur, *The Life of Lord Wolseley*. (London, 1924), pp. 66, 148.

²⁸Field Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, *Forty-one Years in India* (New York, 1901), p. 374.

²⁹[London] *Times*, Oct. 20, 1897.

²⁴Quoted in Susanne Howe, *Novels of Empire* (New York, 1949), p. 76.

²⁵Frederick Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie. A Diary of the Ashantee Campaign* (London, 1874), p. 279.

It would be only reasonable to expect the correspondents to resent some of the treatment they received and to take the first opportunity to even the score. Occasionally they did, and there are several instances of bitter post-campaign controversies between correspondents and commanders. One such debate followed the Zulu campaign in 1880. On the whole, however, there is little evidence that the generals who established strict news controls suffered in consequence at the hands of the reporters. If the correspondents felt aggrieved at being denied military confidence, they rarely made an issue of it. On the contrary, men like Kitchener and Wolseley fared very well indeed in the press accounts. The reporters of the imperialistic wars admired competence and they were happy to overlook other qualities in the men who possessed it. In the following picture drawn by G. W. Steevens, Kitchener is hardly a lovable figure but he is one to inspire confidence. Other correspondents in the Soudan could not rival Steevens' descriptive skill, but most of them supported him in praise of the Sirdar.

Major-General Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener is forty-eight years old by the book; but that is irrelevant. He stands several inches over six feet, straight as a lance, and looks out imperiously above most men's heads; his motions are deliberate and strong; slender but firmly knit, he seems built for tireless, steel-wire endurance rather than for power or agility: that also is irrelevant. Steady passion-less eyes shaded by decisive brows, brick-red rather full cheeks, a long moustache beneath which you divine an immovable mouth; his face is harsh, and neither appeals for affection nor stirs dislike. All this is irrelevant too; neither age, nor figure, nor face, nor any accident of person, has any bearing on the essential Sirdar. You could imagine the character just the same as if all the externals were different. He has no age but the prime of life, no body but one to carry his mind, no face but one to keep his brain behind. The brain and the will are the essence and the whole of the man—a brain and a will so perfect

in their workings that, in the face of extremest difficulty, they never seem to know what struggle is. You cannot imagine the Sirdar otherwise than as seeing the right thing to do and doing it. His precision is so inhumanly unerring, he is more like a machine than a man. You feel that he ought to be patented and shown with pride at the Paris International Exhibition. British Empire: Exhibit No. I., *hors concours*, the Sudan Machine.³⁰

In Great Britain, as in France, Germany, and every imperialistic power, the advance of Empire produced internal protest and party dissension. Controversy accompanied many of the decisions that led to the little wars, and there were usually anti-expansionist press organs that continued to criticize throughout the wars. Almost none of this, however, was reflected in the news dispatches from the field. The correspondents might criticize tactical decisions, or the failure of the home government to provide adequately for an expedition, but their literature was free from political discussion and innocent of social reproach. It could be argued, of course, that the reporter's assignment did not call for such things any more than it called for essays in literary criticism. His job was to describe an expedition, not to philosophize regarding its deeper implications; that could be left to the editors and pamphleteers at home. Besides, the circumstances of employment in the frontier wars did not encourage anti-imperialistic propaganda.

The argument is valid up to a point but it does not explain fully the remarkable uniformity in the reporting of the little wars. The day finally came when representatives of the anti-imperialistic journals carried the home controversies to the frontiers. In 1898 Ernest N. Bennett, who had been dispatched by the *Westminster Gazette* to report the Khartoum campaign, declared that Omdurman was "not a victory, it was a conquest." He noted that Egyptian officers, even of high military rank, were forced to travel second

³⁰Steevens, *With Kitchener to Khartoum*, pp. 45-46.

class on the trains with British sergeant-majors and warrant officers. He demanded that the Dervishes be entitled to consideration as an armed force, and he vehemently denounced their indiscriminate slaying by British camp followers after a battle. He ridiculed the idea that the campaign could be viewed as an effort to defend hearth and home. Instead of romance and adventure, he saw only the wanton, pointless destruction of a people that did not have a chance against superior weapons.³¹

To the correspondents of the older school, Bennett and his ilk were cheap notoriety hunters, and their charges "intolerable humbug."³² But by the end of the century the day of the men who had served as the voices of imperialism from the battlefields was passing. Even in Fleet Street their incurable romanticism became the subject of jokes, and questions were raised as to whether they were worth what they cost. They continued in the field during the Boer War, but they were joined there by the Bennetts. The peak of the imperialistic advance had been reached, and subsequent wars saw progressively less of the adventurous oldsters.

It cannot be maintained that the correspondent was essential to the imperialistic impulse for he was predominantly a British phenomenon. Russian advances into Asia were made without benefit of newspaper men, save for such occasional representatives of the London press as MacGahan and O'Donovan. In North America the Indian Wars, which supplied the nearest counterpart to the imperialistic struggles in Asia and Africa, produced lively reporting,³³ as did a number of French, Italian, and Japanese ex-

peditions, but there was nothing elsewhere to approach the consistent pattern developed by the British. This does not mean, however, that the influence of the heralds of the imperialistic wars was restricted to the British. Their accounts were of interest and were widely read outside of England. H. L. Mencken recently recalled his impressions on reading at the turn of the century G. W. Steevens' *With Kitchener to Khartoum and From Capetown to Ladysmith*. "They made a powerful impression on me," Mencken states, "and I still believe that Steevens was the greatest newspaper reporter who ever lived."³⁴

For three decades the public, more particularly the British public, viewed the colonial wars through the eyes of the correspondents and learned from them most of what they knew about the struggles of empire. The story was one of wholehearted belief in the blessings of civilization which were being carried to the heathen for the good of the heathen and for the good of the conquerors. It was set in romantic surroundings, far removed from the troublesome controversies at home, and the reporters took care that the two did not meet. Between wars the correspondents kept the story going on the lecture platforms, where they often appeared in fitting campaign attire, and by publishing their collected dispatches in books, a number of which became best sellers. Few of them possessed literary skill of a high order; Steevens was a notable exception. Most of them repeated clichés time after time, year after year, and managed to make their battles sound very much alike whether the scene of fighting was the mountains of India or the Sudanese desert. This did not matter greatly, for the correspondents understood the prevailing mood they had helped to create.

³¹Ernest N. Bennett, *The Downfall of the Dervishes* (London, 1898), pp. 7, 24, 182, 227.

³²Burleigh, *Khartoum Campaign*, pp. 334-40.

³³Elmo Scott Watson, "The Indian Wars and the Press," *Journalism Quarterly* (Dec., 1940), XVII, 301-12.

³⁴H. L. Mencken, *Newspaper Days, 1899-1906* (London, 1942), p. 12n.

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REVIEWS

Kesselring—A Soldier's Record. By Albert Kesselring. With an introduction by S. L. A. Marshall. (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1954. Pp. 381. \$5.00.)

The verbatim translation of the German title of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's book would have read "A Soldier to the Very Last Day," and this title seems to spell out the message the author wants to convey. In his very interesting introduction S. L. A. Marshall, the former Chief Historian of the European Theatre, describes Kesselring's personality. According to Marshall, the proper nature of military loyalty was no problem for a man like Kesselring. "He could not turn like the men of July 20, twist like Rommel, retire to his tent like Rundstedt or blow hot and cold like Guderian. His task was the fighting of the battle. His view of duty was to stay the course."

Kesselring explains his own ideas on loyalty and division of power as follows: "There is an inner contradiction between politics and soldiering. Only exceptional persons can combine the two. There is some truth in the remark that a soldier who gives his attention to politics ceases to be a good soldier. I know from my own experience of war that political discussions in critical military situations can influence military performance. A division of power seems to me the sound solution."

Quite as fascinating as the analysis of Kesselring's personality is the study of his career. He served as an artillery officer in World War I and assisted General von Seeckt in organizing the Reichswehr during the post-war years. He was one of the first German officers who realized the need for a unified supra-services command agency.

As early as 1924-25 he wrote the first memorandum on the formation of an armed forces general staff. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Germans were the first to create an armed forces command in 1933; during World War II its effectiveness could not be put to a true test because Hitler used the Armed Forces High Command as a tool to dominate and eventually submerge the recalcitrant Army General Staff.

At Hitler's assumption of power in January 1933, Kesselring was in command of an artillery regiment in Dresden. A few months later he was offered a transfer to the newly created Luftwaffe. Upon his acceptance of this offer he rose rapidly in rank, showing great ability both as troop commander and Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe. He played an important part in developing new airplane models and organizing the first German parachute units.

At the outbreak of war Kesselring was in command of the First Air Force. He participated in the Polish and French Campaigns and was in charge of the Luftwaffe contingents that fought in the Battle of Britain. His opinion on the reasons for the German failure of defeating the Royal Air Force are of particular interest to the student of military history.

During the Battle of Britain occurred an incident that sheds an interesting light on Kesselring's way of thinking. He ordered that no missions be flown over Britain during the Christmas and New Year's Eve holidays of 1940, but his assumption that the enemy would do the same apparently proved wrong. He continues by stating: "I cannot entirely acquit myself of blame for often

allowing myself to be overinfluenced by human feelings. I say this emphatically and without fear of contradiction, despite my condemnation to death for inhumanity" in the War Crimes trials.

The description of the preparations for the Russian Campaign is of interest because it clearly shows the boundless optimism with which the German military leaders approached this new problem. Kesselring, who subsequently commanded in the Mediterranean theater for almost three years, states now that he favored the idea of "striking a hard, and perhaps decisive, blow at Russia from the countries bordering on the Mediterranean." Such an operation would have simultaneously hit Britain at her most vulnerable spot. However, "obsessed with continental ideas, Hitler disastrously underrated the Mediterranean's importance," a reproach that is to recur frequently in the following pages devoted to that theater of war.

To the Luftwaffe in general and Kesselring in particular the invasion of the Soviet Union was just another hurdle that had to be jumped to achieve unchallenged supremacy. Kesselring accepted the new challenge with confidence, and his optimism seemed justified by the initial course of the German offensives up to the fall of 1941 when he was appointed Commander in Chief South and transferred to Italy. His last comments regarding the Russian theater pertain to Hitler's refusal to recruit or employ White Russian and Ukrainian troops against the Soviets. "Anyone who has ever seen what vast numbers of magnificent and willing Russians there were to draw on can only regret Hitler's attitude. From 1943 until the end of the war I had under me German-Russian formations, which, with no hope of realizing their cherished aim of freeing their country from the Bolsheviks, remained true to the bitter end; with their support on a larger scale in all probability our objectives could have been reached. Thus in the military field, and not only in the guerilla section [sic], the price was exacted for the mistaken racial policy of Hitler and his associates."

After having been submerged by Rommel-worshipping literature during the past years, the reader of Kesselring's book will be glad to have an opportunity of seeing the other side of the picture. The Mediterranean story begins with a very detailed account of Rommel's successes, showing the support he received from Kesselring who, as theater commander, was responsible for coordinating and integrating the operations of the three services in Italy as well as her colonies and posses-

sions. Constant friction and jurisdictional conflicts between German and Italian commanders in the field required from Kesselring an almost superhuman effort at ironing out differences.

In describing the course of the North African campaign from El Alamein to the German surrender in Tunisia, Kesselring conveys a clear picture of the tension that prevailed on the Axis side in the "forgotten" Mediterranean theater. Although he had direct access to Hitler—an advantage granted to few field commanders—Kesselring was usually outmaneuvered by Rommel who at that time had better contacts at Supreme Headquarters. This wire pulling and intriguing, in addition to the continuous conflicts with their lukewarm ally—Italy—was to cost the Germans dearly during the later part of the war.

The description of the fighting in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy shows Kesselring's ability of achieving maximum effect with improvised means. He also played an important part in securing Germany's grip on Italy during the defection of that country's government in 1943, when for several weeks he found himself in a delicate situation which he handled masterfully.

Many an American participant in the fighting at Salerno, Anzio, Cassino, and in the mountains north of Rome will be interested in Kesselring's presentation of this story. His opinions about partisan warfare seem to be colored by his post-war experiences, although even there the author makes a laudable attempt at objectivity.

The Field Marshal's ability of making the best of an almost hopeless situation was probably the reason why Hitler appointed him Commander in Chief West in early March 1945. At that time Hitler put all his hopes in the effect of the miracle weapons that were to restore the balance of power *in extremis*. Kesselring himself was probably one of the most miraculous weapons still at the Fuehrer's disposal in the spring of 1945: a capable military leader who refused to despair and whose loyalty was unimpaired. Hitler immediately put Kesselring to work. The containment of the Remagen bridgehead across the Rhine swallowed up the last German reserves in the West. Yet, Kesselring issued orders to hang on, and did his best to stem the tide. What followed was a series of confused local engagements leading to the end of the war in Europe.

Kesselring describes his post-war experiences with a certain amount of grace and sense of humor, which were instrumental in helping him over

hardships and disappointments. His contribution to the writing of military history is given proper acknowledgement in S. L. A. Marshall's introduction, which tells about the origin of the Foreign Studies program that was initiated in Europe and is being continued by the Office of the Chief of Military History of the Department of the Army in Washington, D. C.

A few concluding remarks about the translation which, though generally adequate, uses British abbreviations and designations that are not easily intelligible to the average American reader. It is regrettable that the publishers did not employ a qualified U. S. military editor to revise the translation and introduce proper military terminology before the book was printed in this country.

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The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879-1921, by Isaac Deutscher. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. 540. \$6.00.)

Leon Trotsky's introduction to military problems occurred during the Balkan wars when he was a war reporter. Later, he ran the military phases of the October revolution, winning in the process the Petrograd garrison to his cause. Trotsky wound up as commissar of war, establishing and organizing the Red army, playing a most prominent part in the conduct of the Civil War and supervising the Communist conquest, by military and revolutionary means, of the Ukraine and some of the Caucasian and Central Asian nations. Trotsky was a unique figure among modern military leaders and a study of his career is therefore highly illuminating. The military parts of Deutscher's volume are not the best portions of the book. Yet *The Prophet Armed* will prove of interest to the military reader.

Deutscher's book has been praised as an objective and definitive history of Leon Trotsky, next to Lenin and Stalin the most prominent Bolshevik. It also has been condemned as a partisan and hence biased review of that revolutionary's early career. Neither evaluation is quite justified. The book is not excessively objective and it hardly is definitive. It is clearly slanted in favor of Trotsky; and, unfortunately, the author—who partly was financed by the Humanities Department of the Rockefeller Foundation—fails to make his bias

explicit. However, while falling short of objectivity, this study is not really partisan in the narrow sense of the word. The author has *tried* to present a true historical picture. Unable to set aside the memories of earlier dreams, he was not entirely successful; Trotsky emerges as a better man than he really was and, likewise, the Communist revolution shows up as a far more acceptable event than it was in actuality.

Still, the reader must guard against the author's distortions. Here are a few examples of them: On page 399 he asserts that the generals commanding the White forces were "monarchists *tout court*" which is a wild exaggeration, if not an untruth reiterated time and again throughout the Communist and pro-Communist literature; on page 314 he whitewashes Trotsky of his guilt in the juridical murder of Admiral Shchastny, failing to read up on the documentation of this extraordinary case (the Admiral was the first "legal" victim of the death penalty after it had been re-introduced by the Bolshevik); on the same page he almost (though not quite) justifies Trotsky's terroristic measures against relatives of non-Communist military officers; on page 500 he avers that "it was not the revolution's fault that, because of inherited poverty and the devastation of several wars and of blockade, it could not honor its promise" of setting up a rational and more satisfactory economy—in other words, "capitalism" is to blame if "Communism" does not work; and on page 505, he advances the argument that "the bolshevik regime could be succeeded only by utter confusion followed by open counter-revolution," thus apologizing for the refusal of Lenin's party "to allow the famished and emotionally unhinged country to vote their party out of power and itself into a bloody chaos." This argument, naturally, would justify the Bolshevik's indefinite stay in power.

These quotes and arguments should reveal the author's bias clearly. It also must be remarked that Deutscher's accuracy is not always above reproach. For example: the French Black Sea mutiny is described as a revolt of the French garrison at Odessa; and the Kapp *Putsch* in Germany allegedly was undertaken by "a section of the German army" and undone "by a general strike of the German workers" for which the initiative "had come from the trade unions, not from the Communists." Both are inaccuracies or plan errors of fact. Many additional mistakes and distortions have been found by other reviewers.

There are two items for which Deutscher deserves commendation: He is the first among "leftist" authors who does not believe that the official Communist version of why Lenin signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty is entirely convincing. Second, Deutscher discusses freely Trotsky's advocacy of slave labor. Not only does he not conceal this dark chapter in Trotsky's life, but he makes it plain that on this point he disagrees sharply with his idol. Deutscher called Trotsky's proposals to "militarize" work an "aberration..". What he fails to see is that Trotsky was quite logical in saying "that the worker's state had the right to use forced labor." The fact is that forced or militarized labor is a precondition of centralized economic planning, and hence an integral part of socialism. Deutscher should re-read the *Communist Manifesto* where Marx and Engels proposed the introduction of compulsory labor. If Deutscher had understood more clearly that Trotsky and his cause in *their entirety* are an "aberration," he would have written a more definitive book.

Admiral Kimmel's Story. By Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.). (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954. Pp. 208, \$3.75.)

Many students of history have long awaited the publication of such a book as this in order to learn the other side of the Pearl Harbor story: Admiral Kimmel's story. To some, the book may be disappointing because of the belief that an even stronger case could have been made for the propriety of Admiral Kimmel's decisions and acts prior to 7 December 1941. But it is Admiral Kimmel's story and he tells it as he apparently wished it to be told.

Based in large part on his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Joint Congressional Investigation—large excerpts of the text are repeated almost verbatim—the book contains ten absorbing chapters of varying length; some, however, of disappointing brevity (Chapter V has six pages; Chapter VII has one page). In the first four chapters Admiral Kimmel describes the background to Pearl Harbor, the Pacific Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base deficiencies, the information and orders received prior to December 7, and the important information Kimmel claims was withheld from him. His listing of the many despatches decoded by the Navy Department is

impressive; the repetition of his pungent comment, "This information was never supplied to me," has the slow cadence and solemn finality of a funeral march. These four chapters state the case for Admiral Kimmel; the remaining six chapters explore semicontroversial subjects such as the alleged "suppression" of evidence in Chapter VI; the various investigations into the Pearl Harbor disaster, Chapter VIII; and the distressing examples of vilification encountered by Kimmel, Chapter IX.

Perhaps the reader will wish that there could have been a fuller discussion of why it was impossible to stay continuously at General Quarters from November 27, 1941, the date of the so called War Warning Message, and thus be properly "alerted." Admiral Kimmel states on page 107: "In 1941, we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of generalized warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on aggressive action in the Far East at any one of the variously predicted dates. After receipt of such warnings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity and zeal our own training program and preparations for war rather than to go on an all-out local alert against attack."

In the reviewer's opinion, the average American citizen has never appreciated several important factors relevant to the Pearl Harbor attack which are discussed in this book. These were: the scarcity of fuel oil in Pearl Harbor which limited the operations of fleet units; the requirement nevertheless to operate fleet units on these scanty oil resources as a seagoing "school" for the green recruits pouring into the Pacific Fleet and replacing Kimmel's veterans; the scarcity of long-range patrol planes, thus preventing any adequate search outward from the Hawaiian Islands; and, last, the apparent failure of the Navy Department to recognize that, in view of the above factors, Kimmel was a sitting duck unless he could know within rather narrow time limits the probable time of a threatened attack. This latter was the major failure; from it, in turn, probably stemmed the failure to send Kimmel the "magic" translations of the secret Japanese coded messages seeking specific information on the mooring positions of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. The book discusses all of these factors, but it is regretted that the author did not devote twice, or thrice, the space to these points. For until they are more fully and completely told, the American public will not appreciate fully the circumstances leading up to Pearl Harbor or be able to pierce the fog of

charge and countercharge which still surrounds that tragic event.

Admiral Kimmel has in his book made a sincere effort to help dispel the fog. The relation of events and facts in Chapters II, III, and IV are the strong portions of his book; they support the opinion held by many thoughtful naval officers and men, who served with Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, that he was not to blame for the disaster. The book may well serve to convince many Americans that they are in full accord with Kimmel's closing words:

"Again and again in my mind I have reviewed the events that preceded the Japanese attack, seeking to determine if I was unjustified in drawing from the orders, directives and information that were forwarded to me the conclusions that I did. The fact that I then thought and now think my conclusions were sound when based upon the information I received, has sustained me during the years that have passed since the first Japanese bomb fell on Pearl Harbor."

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Ships, Machinery and Mossbacks. By Vice Admiral Harold G. Bowen, U.S.N. (Retired). (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954. Pp. 397. \$6.00.)

The ships of the Navy would be unsafe and unreliable in operation if converted to high pressure-high temperature engines—so warned the Navy's General Board, many Navy engineering officers, and a large number of old time "sea dogs." High pressure-high temperature steam plants were essential to increase the cruising radius of our fleet, and were in keeping with great advances in shore power plants fathered by American industry, argued the proponents in Naval engineering and industry. Thus, the battle raged during the period of 1930 and 1938 in Naval shipbuilding circles with Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen leading the fight for advanced engineering designs in our Naval vessels.

Admiral Bowen won this fight aided by the turbine and boiler manufacturers of the country as evidenced by the present plants now used at sea. In accordance with the Admiral's analysis, the superior cruising range of all Naval vessels constructed in our World War II program allowed our Navy greater freedom of action in its Pacific Ocean campaigns.

Throughout his Naval career extending from

1901 when he entered the U. S. Naval Academy, until his retirement in 1947, Admiral Bowen was always in the forefront of a good fight for what he believed to be engineering developments that would improve the fighting ability of our Navy. In his autobiography he relates his efforts to introduce cost consciousness into Navy Yard management, his struggle to improve engineering education in the Navy, and his efforts to improve habitability of our ships by increasing illumination and reducing noise in high speed machinery. His determined and successful drive to introduce advanced engineering practice in steam engineering plants and to develop effective modern diesel engines in our submarines were brought to a conclusion in his four years as Chief of the Bureau of Engineering (1935-1939).

From Bureau Chief, Admiral Bowen was ordered in charge of the Naval Research Laboratory, a move his friends considered as "banishment." This banishment served the Navy well as the reader discovers in the Admiral's account of the development of radar and sonar, early work with nuclear materials, light armor developments and many other advances in which the Naval Research Laboratory played a vital role while he directed its operations.

During the war, Admiral Bowen was delegated by the President to seize and operate a great variety of industrial organizations which were not operating in adequate support of the war effort either due to mismanagement or labor troubles. This was a strenuous period in his life and the Admiral reports great success and shows himself to be an able manager and skilled mediator in bringing such plants as Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company and Remington Rand's "N" Division of Elmira, New York, up to maximum operating efficiency as part of the industrial war machine. The Admiral reports that at times he was responsible for the operation of up to four plants spread from Bridgeport, Conn., to San Pedro, Calif. Near the close of the war, Admiral Bowen was appointed as the first Chief of Research and Inventions, later changed to the Office of Naval Research. In this, his final task, he continued an earlier struggle to improve the situation regarding government personnel patents and established a successful organization in the new Office of Naval Research. In assuming these duties the outstanding contributions of this stalwart patriot were finally recognized by his promotion to the rank of Vice Admiral and the awarding of the

Distinguished Service Medal by James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy.

Throughout this book, Admiral Bowen substantiates many of his contentions with formulas and tables that may be slightly over the head of the layman. However, it is a highly interesting and readable account of many engineering developments that have taken place in the Navy, some of which have not been reported previously in such detail. The Admiral is generous in his praise of the many officers and civilians who helped him. Neither does he hesitate to name those who opposed him in his various hard driving fights to improve Naval engineering. Admiral Bowen's autobiography should be most interesting to all Naval officers and that section of American industry connected with the building of ships and their thousands of component parts.

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Stormy Ben Butler. By Robert S. Holzman. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. Pp. 246, Notes, Bibliography, Index. \$5.00.)

Ben Butler, probably the most versatile and controversial figure of the climactic Civil War era, is here made the subject of the first book length biography since the autobiographical *Butler's Book* of 1892. The author, Robert S. Holzman, Ph.D., Professor of Taxation at the New York University Graduate School of Business Administration, has made use of the voluminous Butler manuscripts of the Library of Congress and of the Butler scrapbooks of the Boston Public Library. Excellent notes, bibliography and index prove the quality and quantity of the source material.

Dr. Holzman, however, should read the Staff Officers' Field Manual on the aspects of a good Intelligence Officer. His collection of information pertaining to the "enemy" has been excellent. But the evaluation and interpretation of this information as to accuracy and dependability has been lacking and probably faulty. The dissemination of intelligence leaves much to be desired, the biography seems much too short for the stature of the subject and the material at hand, the author's penchant for excessive quotation is satiating, and failure to make an evaluation as to the truth or falsity of statements, actions and motives leaves the reader in an advanced state of puzzle-

ment. Maybe, however, it is asking too much of a biographer to cease being a mugwump and to develop a definite party line.

Ben Butler claims in his autobiography that "In all military movements I never met with disaster." This claim can only be made by blaming the failure at Big Bethel and the fiasco at Fort Fisher on subordinates. However, he must be given credit for cleaning up the mess at New Orleans, even though he made enemies of the South, the Navy, practically all foreign countries, and of his superiors in Washington.

Dr. Holzman delineates well the "Massachusetts general," professional lawyer rather than professional soldier, administrator rather than tactician or strategist, cantankerous and disputatious politician rather than tactful or studious statesman. The political aspects of General Butler's life are given top billing in this era of extravagant political life and expression. The descriptions from a military standpoint of the battles and campaigns of which Ben Butler was a part are poorly set forth, there is no sense of dynamics or movement, and, parenthetically, there are no maps. The tremendous background symphony of the Civil War is largely ignored except for the role played by the discordant soloist, Butler.

There are numerous by-products of the life of Butler and of the era that are included in this biography—the hatred of the militiaman or the volunteer for the regular officer and his West Pointism, the results of faulty or tardy communications, the vacillations in Washington as to strategy and command, so that men like Butler were allowed to go their own merry way without obeying orders from above, the evident fear of Grant for Butlerism resulting in undue appeasement, the fallacy of dual command in joint operations, and the tremendous influence of the political upon the military. Some of these controversies have been evaluated and the lessons digested, some have not.

Dr. Holzman's book is readable, always interesting, and even amusing. Its chief value is in its again bringing to life the controversial character of Ben Butler, and in making us think of the difficulty of decision under similar circumstances.

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The Land They Fought For, by Clifford Dowdy. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1955. Pp. 438. \$6.00.) One of the Mainstream of America Series edited by Lewis Gannett.

This volume is a popular history of the South as the Confederacy (1832-1865) by Clifford Dowdy, a representative of the South in what promises to develop into a new group of journalistic historians. This term might well be applied to such authors as Bruce Catton, V. C. "Pat" Jones, Daniel O'Flaherty, James D. Horan, and Dowdy himself, originally journalists who turned to the field of history and related biography, notably of the American Civil War period. They are bringing a freshness in their writings, a human appeal of people interested in people, an avoidance of the stultifying atmosphere of the academic scientific historian. Whether these men can maintain high standards of truth and accuracy and yet avoid becoming members of what Neil Swanson has called "a cult of grave diggers" remains to be seen.

In this book the author begins with the Nat Turner Rebellion and carries the story of the South through the Civil War. Throughout he plays upon a psychological theme as an explanation of the "Southern Mind," developing the thesis that many, if not most, of the political determinations of the South were the outgrowth of a defensive attitude brought about by years of Northern "Cold War." This same theme is used to explain the peculiarities of Jefferson Davis and that military anomaly, Braxton Bragg.

The war itself is told in a rather routine fashion with emphasis upon the author's generalizations, and battles and campaigns are treated in general terms. The author draws many conclusions about men and events, but the reader is not always sure of the factual basis of them. His processes are deductive rather than inductive.

The account would have been better balanced had, for instance, Colonel P. S. George Cooke been given his due credit for holding the Confederate left at Manassas (after all, Jackson was not the only brigadier present), had more than a brief mention been made of Gorgas and the Ordnance Bureau, had Isaac M. St. John and the Nitre and Mining Bureau received some recognition, had the work of the Navy been recognized, had General Gabriel J. Rains's work in land mines

and explosives been recognized, or had the differences in railroad gauges been considered.

The author has hinged his story of the war on certain definite conclusions that warrant enumeration. First, the war generation of the South had been subjected to a constant and unrelenting "Cold War" of nerves and constant pressure since birth. Second, Davis' delusions as to his own military genius were the source of most of the basic military problems of the Confederacy (particularly his fetish of "departments" rather than armies, and the defense of fixed positions). Third, the cotton embargo was fateful and ruinous in that it eliminated the only source of ready cash. Fourth, the last military chance of the Confederacy evaporated at Sharpsburg (Antietam), and fifth, the Emancipation Proclamation as propounded by Lincoln was strictly a war measure, not a humanitarian move.

Mr. Dowdy is not impressed with Grant as a military leader, summarizing, "In the West he had fought Davis; in the East he fought Lee." He scores Sherman for fighting a war that would defeat the avowed aim of the North, re-union, by creating hatred and deep-seated animosity in the South by his policy of taking the war to the people instead of confining it to the people's army.

He considers Lee "the only general with the power, won through tact and success, to play his own game of cause and effect." Lee earns his sympathy and admiration for coping with Davis, yet retaining the confidence of the Executive.

Several errors in details creep into the narrative. For example, in the description of the battle of Fredericksburg (p. 233) the author places most of Lee's infantry behind the sunken road at the base of Marye's Heights. Also ascribing the crater at Petersburg to Grant (p. 351) is subject to closer scrutiny.

An eleven-page bibliography is attached indicating a rather thorough coverage of the books in the field, yet current periodical literature is almost totally missing. The volume does not measure up to Mr. Dowdy's "Experiment in Rebellion" (1946) but will have an appeal to the general reader, and its generalizations will provoke discussions. In the reviewer's opinion it falls short of being a good *history*.

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The Middle East. By Halford L. Hoskins. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1954. Pp. 311. \$4.75.)

Dr. Hoskins' timely work on the Middle East reflects his unquestioned understanding of the subject and of the importance of this part of the world to all free nations. While it does not purport to be an outline of national policy, it does set forth and summarize the problem in a manner calculated to provide at a minimum what might be termed "guide lines for policy." The final chapter, "The Search for Situations of Strength," indicates courses of action which have failed, and the reasons for failure.

Dr. Hoskins misses none of the factors which are germane to Middle Eastern considerations today. His analysis is penetrating and complete. A brief geographic and political background chapter sets of pace for the entire volume and carries one through the complicated course of events surrounding the problems of the Straits and Turkey and the international and local political aspects of the Suez Canal Question. Dr. Hoskins considers the complications growing out of Anglo-Egyptian relations and the Sudan question, the position of Israel in the Middle East, and the problems which have arisen from the establishment of that state in an Arab World.

Arab nationalism is accurately analyzed, and the factors, both synthetic and natural, which go to make up this growing force are seen in a clear and realistic light. The history of the Arab World, the beginnings of the new states which have emerged since the end of World War I, and the story of the older states, such as Iran, is related against a backdrop of foreign interests in the area. Russian aims, from the days of Peter the Great, are brought into the picture, not only with relation to Iran and other contiguous nations, but in connection with all Middle Eastern nations of today and their position in the world struggle.

The story of Middle Eastern oil is woven into the book almost from beginning to end, and the strategic worth of this oil to the West, and in particular to Western Europe, is accurately appraised.

Dr. Hoskins' treatment of the Middle East is rather brief, yet the manner in which he has separated the essential from the nonessential and emphasized the former makes the volume more complete than many similar studies which are considerably more extensive. For either the advanced student of this area, or for the beginner, this book has much to offer. It goes on the "must" list.

S. G. TAXIS

The Middle East; a Political and Economic Survey, by Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Department. (2nd ed.; London and New York: 1954. Pp. 590. \$9.00.)

The Middle East today is far better known by the West than it was at the conclusion of the Second World War. Much has happened in ten years to bring this area into sharper focus. Palestine has been the scene of a major effort on the part of the United Nations, the oil industry has developed by leaps and bounds, and the countries and peoples of this land speak ever more articulately in the councils of nations. The basic conflict between Communism and the world of free men is felt from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. As a result of these and other factors the region has become an area of continued interest and major importance in world thinking.

First published in 1950, *The Middle East* is discussed in as great detail as is possible in any single volume of manageable size. The area is first treated as a whole. The region is defined in terms of area, geography, climatology, and strategic importance. This is followed by a general survey of political, religious, economic, and social conditions. From this background the authors proceed to a comprehensive chapter-by-chapter treatment of each of the many countries concerned, under the headings of "The Land and the People," "History and Politics," "Economic Survey," and "Social Survey." The countries described include Saudi Arabia, The Yemen, Aden Colony and Protectorate, The Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, Muscat, Oman, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Iran, The Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey.

The book is replete with tabular statistics, maps, and other appropriate data of similar nature. For the first time, a single authoritative work of reference on the Middle East is available which is of equal value to the student, the general reader, or the specialist. Its carefully written, unbiased substance renders it an exceptionally valuable textbook. Every page reflects the consistently high quality which one expects from publications of Chatham House.

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Political Warfare, by John Scott, (New York: John Day Co., 1955. Pp. 244. Index and bibliography, \$3.75.)

Author John Scott who has written three previous books, essays in his latest to provide a "guide to competitive coexistence." C. D. Jackson states in a well written foreword that "Its author brings to this book a vast amount of knowledge, personal experience and dedicated sincerity" and Mr. Jackson is probably correct.

Starting with the nature of war, Scott takes his readers through destructive and constructive political warfare, their battlefields and the general subject of intelligence. He then expertly contrasts Soviet potentials, intentions and experience in these fields with American political warfare efforts.

There has been a need for such a book for a long time and if the layman, for whom it was intended, read and took it to heart it might do a lot of good. Well written, authoritative, and interesting, it imparts a tremendous amount of factual information and analysis. *Political Warfare* is largely a book of definition and fundamentals of an often used but little understood field. Military men who wish to be well informed will certainly find it most valuable.

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The First Enlisted Women, 1917-1918, by Eunice C. Dessez. (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Co., 1955. Pp. 93. \$2.50.)

This is a well documented and indexed account of the Yeomen (F) in World War I, and fills a gap in the history of that War. It is an account of those 11,000 women who served in the United States Navy and established the precedent for inducting women into the military services.

Many official orders and circulars now difficult or impossible to locate at this time, are directly quoted, having been collected by the author, who was one of the first Yeoman (F) to be inducted into the Service. She is aware of the problem facing the historian in locating documentary information and felt it important that this material be made available to those interested in the military history of women. Miss Dessez's book is a real contribution in that field.

Those who served in World War I will turn back the pages of memory when leafing through; those who have come on since, will be able to form a true picture of the women with courage enough to break the ironclad tradition that the United States Navy was entirely a man's field.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

ANNUAL JOINT SESSION OF THE AMI AND THE AHA

The joint Session of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association will convene at 10 a.m. December 29, in the Chinese Room, Mayflower Hotel, in Washington, D. C. The session topic is entitled "Civil-Military Relations: Historical Case Studies." Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, USN (Ret.), president of the American Military Institute, will act as chairman of the meeting and introduce the participants. The following papers are listed for presentation: "French Politicians and Generals, 1914-1940," by Jere C. King, University of California, Los Angeles; "Conscription in Great Britain, 1900-1914, a Failure in Civil-Military Communications," by Theodore Ropp, Duke University; and "The Elder Pitt—His Admirals and his Generals," by Eric McDermott, S. J., Georgetown University. The Institute is planning a social affair for members to precede or follow the meeting.

FORT ONTARIO BICENTENNIAL

An outpost bastion of colonial America, Fort Ontario celebrated its 200th anniversary with a historical pageant on Flag Day, June 14, 1955. With Fort Ticonderoga, of similar age, Fort Ontario played a historic role in the French and Indian and Revolutionary Wars, and in the War of 1812. The fort is now the property of the New York State Education Department and is being restored in the same manner as were Forts Niagara and Ticonderoga.

CRIME UNCOVERED IN FORT WILLIAM HENRY

Archaeologists unearthed a 200-years-old war crime perpetrated in old Fort William

Henry near Lake George, New York. While restoring the fort the charred bodies of two British soldiers were found in the barracks cellar. It is believed they were massacred by the French and Indians and piled in one of the barracks which was then set afire. Various artifacts were also dug up such as trench shovels, shell fragments, axes, cannon balls, and a hatchet used by Rogers' Rangers. A cuff link was found engraved with the words "God Bless the British Fleet."

COURSE IN INTELLIGENCE METHODS

The husband-and-wife team of Dr. George Bell Dyer and Dr. Charlotte Leavitt Dyer this fall inaugurated a new course at the University of Pennsylvania Graduate School, in Philadelphia, entitled "Basic Intelligence Methods and International Communication." It is to be given every Wednesday afternoon throughout the academic year and affords instruction in intelligence techniques in the evaluation of world affairs. It also includes discussion of freedom of information as opposed to covert intelligence activities and psychological warfare. Doctors Dyer are both experienced specialists in intelligence matters and have authored publications in the subject area. Dr. George Dyer is also an active trustee of the American Military Institute and a member of long standing.

INDEFATIGABLE POSSONY

The American Military Institute can boast of a Board of Trustees rich in scholarship and writing talent but none more assiduous than Steve Possony. Busy as he is travelling and lecturing, he nevertheless manages to toss off a thousand page textbook every so often on such abstruse matters as international re-

lations and the latest barometric readings on the "Cold War." This is by way of drawing the attention of our readers to a most interesting number of *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May 1955, devoted to "Air Power and National Security," and edited by Dr. Stefan T. Possony. A number of prominent authors are represented in this timely symposium, including Thomas K. Finletter, former Air Force Secretary; Professor W. Barton Leach of Harvard; Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State; Professor Eugene M. Emme of the Air University; and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe of the University of Pennsylvania, who has co-authored a number of works with Trustee Possony. The range of topics includes items such as "Air Power and Foreign Policy," "Collective Security in the Air Age," "The Foundations of Soviet Air Power," and "Air Strength of the United States."

DOWN EAST GETS FIRST MICROFILM SET

The University of Maine at Orono, Maine, placed the first order and received the first set of eighteen volumes of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* on microfilm. Also, an annual subscription accompanied the order, states Institute Treasurer Ralph Donnelly. Institute Trustee Foster Gleason is entitled to take a bow at this rapid-fire response to the fruition of his pet project of years' standing—making complete microfilm sets of the Institute's quarterly journal available to all libraries, institutions, and persons desiring them. All requests, price list inquiries, and orders should be addressed to *Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.* A detailed statement relating to this project was published in *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, XIX, 2 (Summer 1955), 117. In a way it seems eminently fitting that the first state along America's first sea-board placed the first order. As in the game of tipping dominoes, the others should follow.

Lives there a voter that heareth not the famed slogan, "As Maine goes—."

NEW LIFE MEMBERS

The American Military Institute, it is a pleasure to announce, recently enrolled two new life members in its growing membership fold: Maurice J. Blackwell, Secretary of the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia, and John I. Moore, small arms collector of San Angelo, Texas. A hearty welcome to Life Members Blackwell and Moore!

JOHN WIKE RECEIVES AWARD

The Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, reports that John Wike of the Organizational History and Honors Branch received an award of \$160 and a suitable certificate for his suggestion on improving OCS Form 10, Official Statement of Lineages and Battle Honors. For years before going to OCMH, Wike served faithfully and well in The National Archives Office of The Adjutant General.

COMMODORE KNOX ON WASHINGTON'S USE OF SEA POWER

To the Editor: Having been edified by the very interesting article on "Revolutionary West Point"* . . . may I reciprocate by pointing to certain naval events relative thereto?

Naval power played the decisive role in the land campaign of 1776. British grand strategy contemplated cutting the Colonies in two on the line of the Hudson by invasions from north and south. Their army coming from Canada required transport on Lake Champlain in view of the wilderness ashore. This necessitated a halt until war craft could be built to outmatch similar American craft built and building. When the British finally gained naval superiority and defeated the American Squadron under General Arnold,

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the season was so late that their army abandoned the campaign.

Meanwhile the main British Fleet had landed an army on Long Island and driven Washington up the east side of the Hudson beyond White Plains. Washington's force was weak from having sent reinforcements to our army in the North. However, pressure against Washington ceased abruptly when General Howe learned of the abandonment of the campaign by the northern British Army. Howe then turned west and crossed the Hudson into New Jersey.

Another point respecting naval power which seems to have escaped our authors, but was . . . well noted by Washington in 1778, was the sudden British evacuation of Philadelphia almost in panic, merely on the report that a superior French Fleet had sailed from Toulon bound for North America. The British had scarcely cleared their heavy supplies from Philadelphia before the French Fleet actually arrived off the Delaware entrance. Even though this first visit of a French Fleet was too brief to accomplish much more, its magical lesson was clear.

The decisive influence of naval power upon land operations in the Revolutionary War was thereafter well recognized by General Washington who very ably governed his plans and operations accordingly. Why this fact should be so inadequately appreciated by military writers, even including Freeman, seems difficult to explain. As an example, consider the statement in the opening paragraph of the article under discussion that the Highlands of the Hudson "were the base on which Washington pivoted his entire strategy from the fall of 1776 until the end of the war." Compare this with Washington's own statement in a letter to Franklin in Paris, summing up the 1780 campaign: "Disappointed . . . especially in the expected naval superiority which was the pivot upon which everything turned, we have been compelled to spend an

inactive campaign, after flattering prospects at the opening of it." This is merely one among many superlative statements respecting the high importance of naval power to his land operations that characterized Washington's letters during a great part of the war.

The handsome reinforcement of a French Army under Rochambeau had been held idle for a year while Washington begged a fleet from the French King, for use in concert with the Allied Armies. The fleet under de Grasse finally sailed for our coast via the West Indies. The Admiral communicated with Washington repeatedly by fast Frigate. The General offered a plan and at first preferred New York as the objective of a joint military-naval attack, but the alternative of Yorktown was acceptable to him and finally adopted. Military history has accorded Washington . . . too little credit for the genius he displayed in recognizing for several years that the only hope of winning the war was through joint employment of a superior fleet with his army; in persistently seeking the naval means for such operations; in planning the Yorktown campaign; and finally, in carrying it out with superlative success.

This is not to question the importance of the Hudson Highlands but to point out the matter of degree respecting them, and to indicate the surpassing influence of naval power in the eyes and plans and victory of the great Washington.

Signed: DUDLEY W. KNOX

INNOCENTS ABROAD

Editor Victor Gondos, Jr., and his spouse, Dr. Dorothy D. Gondos, a member of our staff and of the faculty of American University, sailed for Europe as this issue went to press, leaving the staff detailed instructions but no cable address. It is rumored, though, that the Rhineland, with its gustatory and other delights, was Vic's goal, and we are therefore thankful that the good Dorothy is along as protection against the Lorelei.

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Inquiries regarding the competition for the award should be addressed to the Secretary of the American Military Institute.

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